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THE SUPREME COURT, JUDICIAL ELECTIONS,
AND DARK MONEY
Richard Briffault*

INTRODUCTION
Judges, even when popularly elected, are not representatives; they
are not agents for their voters, nor should they take voter preferences
into account in adjudicating cases. However, popularly elected judges
are representatives for some election law purposes. Unlike other
elected officials, judges are not politicians. But judges are policy-makers. Judicial elections are subject to the same constitutional doctrines
that govern voting on legislators, executives, and ballot propositions.
Except when they are not. The same First Amendment doctrine that
protects campaign speech in legislative, executive, and ballot proposition elections applies to campaign speech in judicial elections—but
not in quite the same way. Independent committees have the same
right to spend in judicial elections as they do in other elections. But
significant independent spending can result in the imposition of a constitutional restriction on the behavior of an elected judge who benefited from that spending. This restriction is without parallel for
elected legislators or executives who benefit from similar independent
spending.
Every statement in the preceding paragraph reflects a decision of
the Supreme Court concerning judicial elections. As the point-counterpoint indicates, the Court’s jurisprudence of judicial elections is a
bit of a mess. Technically, all the decisions can be made to hang together, but their emphases, implications, and rhetoric often differ substantially. They can be summed up in the statement: Judicial elections
are very similar to, but not quite the same as, other elections. Unfortunately, many significant issues fall into the “not quite the same”
space. For now, at least, judicial campaign behavior and judicial campaign finance practices are for the most part governed by the same
First Amendment doctrine that applies to campaign speech and campaign money generally, but that doctrine may not be applied to judicial elections in precisely the same way and some restrictions that
* Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law School.
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would be unconstitutional in most elections may be constitutional in
judicial elections. Given the series of close divides that have marked
the Supreme Court’s judicial election jurisprudence to date, the future
is uncertain.
This has implications for any effort to address the problem of “dark
money” in judicial elections. The term dark money is a short-hand
reference to spending by independent groups that is funded by undisclosed sources. Most likely, dark money in judicial elections can be
regulated to the extent, but only to the extent, that it can be regulated
in other elections. That is, it almost surely can be subject to more
extensive disclosure requirements, but it also almost surely cannot be
limited. The one area in which the judicial election context of dark
money may matter is the possibility that a judge who benefited from
dark money spending may be required to recuse under certain circumstances. But recusal is unlikely to be an effective response to the concerns raised by dark money.
This Article reviews the Supreme Court’s evolving treatment of judicial elections and the resulting implications for the regulation of
dark money in judicial races. Part II provides a brief summary of the
Court’s cases addressing state laws dealing with judicial elections.
This sets up the underlying tension within the Court over whether
elected judges are policymakers or “representatives” of the voters,
like other elected officials. Part III undertakes a more extended treatment of the three cases decided between 2002 and 2015 that directly
address judicial election campaigning and its consequences—Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,1 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,2
and Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar.3 This judicial campaign trilogy
seeks to hold together the First Amendment’s commitment to robust
and unrestricted campaign speech with a growing concern for the implications of judicial campaign spending for the due process value of
impartial judicial decision-making and for the public’s confidence in
the integrity of the judiciary. Part IV examines the meaning of dark
money, how it may be regulated in non-judicial elections, and whether
and to what extent it can be more, or differently, regulated in judicial
elections. Part V concludes.

1. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
2. 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
3. 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
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The Supreme Court’s treatment of judicial elections began with the
assumption that judicial elections are different from other elections
because the role of the judge, and the relationship of the judge to the
electorate, differs from that of other elected officials. In 1972 in Wells
v. Edwards4 the Court summarily affirmed the decision of a threejudge panel holding that judicial elections are not subject to the one
person, one vote requirement that governs elections to executive and
legislative offices.5 In the words of the lower court, “manifestly,
judges . . . are not representatives in the same sense as are legislators
or the executive. Their function is to administer the law, not to spouse
[sic] the cause of a particular constituency.”6 Thus, the “rationale” for
the equal population principle “which evolved out of efforts to preserve a truly representative form of government, is simply not relevant
to the makeup of the judiciary.”7
Two decades later, however, the Court shifted course and determined that elected judges are “representatives” for purposes of voting
rights, albeit in a case of statutory interpretation, not constitutional
doctrine. Chisom v. Roemer addressed whether the anti-vote dilution
provision of the Voting Rights Act, which proscribes voting standards,
practices, or procedures that make it more difficult for protected racial and language minority groups “to elect representatives of their
choice,” applies to judicial elections.8 The defendants argued, relying
in part on Wells, that since judges are not “representatives” the provision of the Voting Rights Act did not apply to judicial elections.9 The
majority disagreed.10 Although the Court’s analysis turned primarily
on congressional intent, the majority, in an opinion written by Justice
Stevens, determined that when judges are chosen by popular election
they are, indeed, to some extent “representatives” of the voting public.11 Justice Stevens acknowledged that “ideally public opinion
should be irrelevant to the judge’s role.”12 But he concluded:
4. 409 U.S. 1095 (1973), aff’g, 347 F. Supp. 453 (M.D. La. 1972).
5. Id.
6. Wells, 347 F. Supp. at 455 (quoting Stokes v. Fortsen, 234 F. Supp. 575, 577 (N.D. Ga.
1964)).
7. Id. at 455.
8. 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
9. Id. at 380.
10. Id. at 416.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 400.
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The fundamental tension between the ideal character of the judicial
office and the real world of electoral politics cannot be resolved by
crediting judges with total indifference to the popular will while simultaneously requiring them to run for elected office. When each of
several members of a court must be a resident of a separate district
and must be elected by voters of that district, it seems both reasonable and realistic to characterize the winners as representatives of
that district.13

Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy
sharply dissented. Judges may be elected by the people, Justice Scalia
wrote, but they do not represent the people “in the ordinary sense. . . .
[T]he judge represents the Law—which often requires him to rule
against the People.”14
The back-and-forth between Wells and Chisom nicely illustrates the
tension in the Court over whether elected judges are representatives
in terms of their relationship to the electorate in the way that other
elected officials are.15 Two other cases that may provide additional
insight on the issue are Gregory v. Ashcroft16 and New York State
Board of Elections v. Lopez Torres.17 Gregory was not an elections
case; rather, it addressed whether the Missouri Constitution’s requirement that judges retire at the age of seventy violates the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act’s ban on mandatory retirement.
The Act exempted from the ban, inter alia, state appointees “on the
policymaking level.”18 Noting that judges “exercise . . . discretion concerning issues of public importance,” the Court concluded that Missouri’s appointed judges “fall presumptively under the policymakinglevel exemption.”19 To be sure, the Court’s federalism concern placed
a thumb on the scale by presuming that a state constitution should set
13. Id. at 400–01.
14. Id. at 410–11.
15. See also Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646 (1991) (reviewing application of section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act to judicial elections); Houston Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Attorney General, 501 U.S.
419 (1991) (upholding application of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to the election of trial
judges). For a recent assessment of the law governing judicial election districting in the aftermath of Williams-Yulee, see Alec Webley, Judges Are (Not?) Politicians: Williams-Yulee v. The
Florida Bar and the Constitutional Law of Redistricting of Judicial Election Districts, 19 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 851 (2016).
16. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
17. 552 U.S. 196 (2008).
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (1982).
19. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 466–67. The Act also exempted elected officials from the ban. Missouri judges are initially appointed to office and then subject to retention election. In defending
the state constitutionality of its mandatory retirement requirement, Missouri also contended that
these judges fell within the elected official exemption. Because it found that they fell within the
“appointee on the policymaking level” exemption, the Court did not have to address whether
they were elected within the meaning of the Act. Id. at 467.
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the rules for state judicial selection unless clearly displaced by federal
law, so that any ambiguity in the federal law was construed in favor of
the state. But the decision still required some recognition of the policymaking role of judges. Indeed, Chisom v. Roemer, decided the
same day as Gregory, drew on Gregory’s “recogni[tion] that judges do
engage in policymaking at some level” in finding judges to be
representatives.20
Lopez Torres involved a First Amendment challenge to New York’s
complex system of political party selection of judicial nominees
through a party convention that the plaintiffs contended favored party
bosses and burdened insurgents.21 The case focused on the associational rights of political parties and the conflicting First Amendment
rights of parties and their members, relying entirely on precedents
concerning the party role in elections for executive or legislative office. That the dispute involved a judicial election seemed to be of almost no moment to the Court, except for a passing observation that
the state legislature, which enacted the judicial convention system,
might prefer conventions to primaries for the nomination of judicial
candidates because a primary “leaves judicial selection to voters uninformed about judicial qualifications, and places a high premium upon
the ability to raise money.”22 Lopez Torres did not directly address
the “representative” question, but it does have implications for
whether judicial elections can be treated as different from other elections. The overall thrust of the opinion was that the judicial nature of
the election was irrelevant, but, as the quoted language suggests, there
was a slight hint of support for a more restrictive electoral process
when the election of judges is at stake.
III. THE JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN TRILOGY
A. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White
The Supreme Court launched its examination of the state regulation
of judicial election campaigns in 2002 in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, which considered and invalidated the Minnesota Code
of Judicial Conduct’s announce clause.23 The clause provided that a
judicial candidate should not “announce his or her views on disputed
legal or political issues.”24 Promulgated by the Minnesota Supreme
Court in 1974, the announce clause was based on a canon of the
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

501 U.S. 380, 399 n.27 (1991).
552 U.S. 196 (2008).
Id. at 206.
536 U.S. 765 (2002).
Id. at 770.
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Model Code of Judicial Conduct adopted by the American Bar Association in 1972.25
The announce clause can be seen as aimed at preventing circumvention of another restriction on judicial campaign statements—the directive that judicial candidates not make “pledges or promises of conduct
in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office.”26 As Justice Ginsburg contended in her White dissent, “the ban on pledges or promises is easily circumvented” by
“statements that do not technically constitute pledges or promises but
nevertheless ‘publicly mak[e] known how [the candidate] would decide’ legal issues.”27 Nonetheless, the breadth of the announce clause
opened it up to First Amendment attack. When the ABA revised its
Model Code in 1990, it dropped the announce clause. The ABA’s
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility stated its belief
that the clause was “an overly broad restriction on speech,”28 and a
series of state and lower federal court decisions in the 1990s narrowed
or invalidated similar clauses. By the time of the White decision, as a
result of litigation and canon revisions only nine states continued to
impose a version of the announce clause and several of these were
narrower than the Minnesota version challenged in White.29
As a result, the Court’s invalidation of the announce clause was not
in itself that significant.30 But the way the Court did so, in an opinion
for the five-justice majority written by Justice Scalia, was quite striking.31 Most importantly, the Court framed the case as a classic First
Amendment problem. Treating the announce clause as a contentbased restriction that burdened speech “‘at the core of our First
Amendment freedoms’—speech about the qualifications of candidates for public office,” the Court subjected the clause to the most
stringent standard of First Amendment review, strict scrutiny.32
25. Id. at 768.
26. Id. at 770.
27. Id. at 819–20 (citations omitted).
28. JUDICIAL CODE SUBCOMM. OF THE ABA STANDING COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROF. REDRAFT REVISIONS TO THE ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1989).

SPONSIBILITY,

29. See Richard Briffault, Judicial Campaign Codes After Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, 153 U. PENN. L. REV. 181, 203 (2004).
30. Although in the intermediate aftermath of the decision, other states with announce
clauses eliminated them. See id. at 208–09.
31. Justice Scalia’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor,
Kennedy and Thomas. Justice O’Connor and Justice Kennedy also wrote separate concurring
opinions.
32. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002).
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Under strict scrutiny the defenders of the clause had to prove that it
was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.33
The Court then closely parsed the two interests presented by the
state to justify the Clause—preserving the impartiality of the state judiciary and preserving the appearance of the impartiality of the state
judiciary. Noting that the state was “rather vague” about what it
meant by impartiality, Justice Scalia found that “impartiality” could
be used in any of three possible senses: (i) the avoidance of bias with
respect to a specific party in a judicial proceeding; (ii) “the lack of
preconception in favor or against a particular legal view;” or (iii)
open-mindedness, in the sense of being willing to consider views that
oppose the judge’s preconceptions and being open to persuasion.34
Justice Scalia determined that assuring the first meaning of impartiality is a compelling state interest and serves the interest in affording
litigants due process, but that the announce clause was not narrowly
tailored—or tailored at all—to achieve that interest as it did not restrict speech concerning parties, but only speech concerning issues.
Justice Scalia summarily rejected the second definition of impartiality as a compelling state interest or as barely a state interest at all. In
his view, virtually all judges come to the bench after legal careers in
which they must have developed some preconceptions about legal issues. Accordingly, preventing this kind of partiality would be impossible; indeed, it would be undesirable as it would produce judicial
candidates who had never thought deeply about the legal issues they
would have to deal with on the bench.35
The Court then turned to the third definition of impartiality—openmindedness. Justice Scalia acknowledged that “[i]t may well be that
impartiality in this sense, and the appearance of it, are desirable in the
judiciary.”36 But he concluded that the announce clause flunked the
underinclusiveness component of strict scrutiny’s narrow tailoring
prong. In classic First Amendment analysis, a statute or regulation
may fail narrow tailoring because it is either overly broad or underinclusive.37 Overbreadth is fatal because it burdens far more speech
than necessary to achieve the compelling interest. The flaw with underinclusiveness is more subtle. An underinclusive law may be struck
down because it is so incapable of achieving its stated goal that there
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 774–75 (citing election law cases involving executive or legislative candidates).
Id. at 775–81.
Id. at 777–78.
Id. at 778.
See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 207 (1992).
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is no point in sustaining the burden it does impose.38 The limited ability of an underinclusive measure to achieve the asserted interest may
suggest that the stated purpose was not that interest at all, but something else less compelling.39 Limitations placed on the announce
clause by the Minnesota Supreme Court blunted plaintiffs’ overbreadth challenge but may have rendered it more vulnerable to an
underinclusiveness attack.
The announce clause restricted only statements made by judicial
candidates while campaigning. However, according to Justice Scalia,
“statements in election campaigns are such an infinitesimal portion of
the public commitments to legal positions that judges (or judges-tobe) undertake . . . .”40 As he noted, judges and judicial candidates
often express their views on disputed legal questions “outside the context of adjudication” and, for sitting judges, in opinions written while
on the bench. If the announcement of views undermines the fact or
appearance of impartiality as open-mindedness, limiting only campaign statements “is so woefully underinclusive as to render belief in
that purpose a challenge to the credulous.”41
In dissent, Justice Stevens42 contended that campaign statements
are indeed different, justifying special restriction. He explained that
unlike other assertions of views, campaign statements are intended to
convey to the voters a commitment to acting consistently with those
views, and are likely to be so taken by the voters.43 Justice Scalia
responded simply that it “is not self-evidently true” that judges will
feel “significantly greater compulsion, or appear to feel significantly
greater compulsion, to maintain consistency” with campaign statements than other statements.44 Justice Stevens may have had the better of the argument as declarations of views made publicly on the
campaign trail for the purpose of persuading voters may well be seen
and treated as more binding than assertions in a law review article or
even in a judicial opinion, but that only underscores the majority’s
stringent application of the underinclusiveness component of the narrow tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny test.
38. See, e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 865–66 (2015).
39. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah. 508 U.S. 520, 534–40
(1993); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395–96 (1992).
40. White, 536 U.S. at 779.
41. Id. at 780.
42. Justice Stevens’ dissent was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. Justice Ginsburg authored her own dissent, which was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer.
43. White, 536 U.S. at 801–02.
44. Id. at 780–81.
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Three other points about the White majority opinion are worth noting. First, the Court emphasized the significance of the announce
clause’s burden on electoral speech and, in so doing, assimilated judicial election campaigns to other election campaigns for First Amendment purposes. Quoting earlier First Amendment elections cases, the
Court stressed that “‘[D]ebate on the qualifications of candidates’ is
‘at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.’”45 The fact that only judicial elections were affected by the
announce clause was of no moment.
Second, the flipside to the Court’s commitment to treating judicial
elections as akin to other elections was its dismissal of the argument
that the due process interest of litigants requires different rules for
judicial elections. Due process, and the judicial impartiality it requires, was the animating concern of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.46 As
she explained, as a matter of due process, judges owe the litigants
before them a duty of impartiality and owe the public an appearance
of impartiality. Justice Ginsburg asserted this would be compromised
by campaign statements that commit judges to positions on issues
likely to come before them, with the danger of electoral retaliation if
they do not abide by those commitments. Justice Scalia, however,
pooh-poohed the likelihood that campaign statements would constrain judicial decision-making. In his view, if the possibility that an
elected judge’s attention to the impact of a decision on his or her prospects for reelection violates due process, then “the practice of electing
judges is itself a violation of due process”—a conclusion Justice Scalia
rejected out of hand.47 More strikingly, Justice Scalia challenged the
very idea articulated by Justice Ginsburg in the opening words of her
dissent that “judges perform a function fundamentally different from
that of the people’s elected representatives. Legislative and executive
officials act on behalf of the voters who placed them in office.”48 Justice Ginsburg then quoted Justice Scalia’s dissent in Chisom that
stated “judge[s] represen[t] the Law.”49 Despite what he said in
Chisom, Justice Scalia in White responded that “Justice Ginsburg
greatly exaggerates the difference between judicial and legislative
elections. . . . This complete separation of the judiciary from the enterprise of ‘representative government’ might have some truth in those
countries where judges neither make law themselves nor set aside the
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 781 (citations omitted).
Id. at 813–21.
Id. at 783.
Id. at 803.
White, 536 U.S. at 803.
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laws enacted by the legislature. It is not a true picture of the American system.”50
Third, although the overall thrust of the majority’s opinion was to
treat judicial elections just like other elections for First Amendment
purposes—drawing Justice Ginsburg’s condemnation of “this unilocular, ‘an election is an election’ approach,”51—in fact, White did not go
quite that far. Justice Scalia was careful to state “we neither assert nor
imply that the First Amendment requires campaigns for judicial office
to sound the same as those for legislative office.”52 In rejecting Justice
Stevens’ position that statements made in an election campaign pose a
special threat to the fact or appearance of a candidate’s open-mindedness, Justice Scalia was careful to distinguish the announce clause
from Minnesota’s separate canon that merely barred judicial candidates from making campaign “pledges or promises” with respect to
their conduct in office. Justice Scalia noted that Stevens’ argument
“might be plausible, perhaps, with regard to campaign promises.”53
The Court was also careful to avoid expressing a view on the
“pledges or promises” clause, even though such a clause would surely
be unconstitutional if enforced against candidates for legislative or executive office.54 To be sure, the pledges or promises clause was not at
issue in White so there was no need for the Court to address it. But
the Court’s opinion and its careful sidestepping of that clause at least
left open the possibility that some restrictions on judicial campaign
conduct might pass constitutional muster. This is true even if the
overall tenor of the opinion—and especially the concurring opinion of
Justice Kennedy55—treated the First Amendment problem posed by
the regulation of judicial elections as essentially the same as in campaign regulation more generally.
White was followed by a wave of constitutional attacks on many
provisions of the state canons regulating judicial campaign conduct, as
well as by revisions to those canons by the state judicial bodies that
imposed them. One set of challenges and revisions focused on canons
50. Id. at 784.
51. Id. at 805.
52. Id. at 783.
53. Id. at 780 (emphasis in original).
54. See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 55–58 (1982) (stating that some candidate promises
are “universally acknowledged as legitimate”; “Candidate commitments enhance the accountability of government officials to the people whom they represent, and assist the voters in predicting the effect of their vote”; Candidate for county commissioner has a constitutional right to
make promises that “express[ ] . . . his intention to exercise public power in a manner that he
believed might be acceptable to some class of citizens”).
55. White, 536 U.S. at 795 (“The State cannot opt for an elected judiciary and then assert that
its democracy, in order to work as desired, compels the abridgment of speech.”).
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prohibiting judicial candidates from “committing” or “appearing to
commit” themselves “with respect to cases, controversies, or issues
that are likely to come before the court”—arguably a narrower version of the announce clause. Other canons subjected to review in the
aftermath of White included the pledges or promises clause; various
measures restricting the partisan activities of judicial candidates; bans
on the personal solicitation of campaign funds by judicial candidates;
and prohibitions on statements by a candidate that knowingly “misrepresent the identity, qualifications, present position or other fact
concerning the candidate or an opponent.” As a result, many restrictions on judicial campaigning were narrowed or eliminated. However,
the Court’s 2009 decision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. became
something of a speed bump on the road to the complete assimilation
of judicial campaign conduct to the campaigns for executive and legislative offices and ballot propositions. Although Caperton did not address or sustain a constraint on judicial campaign activity, its focus on
the implications of judicial campaigns for the behavior of judges in
office after the election gave new impetus to the due process implications of judicial elections. This had been emphasized by Justice Ginsburg’s White dissent, but downplayed by the White majority.
B. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.
Caperton grew out of the hotly contested 2004 election for a seat on
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in which incumbent Justice Warren McGraw was challenged by attorney Brent Benjamin.
Don Blankenship, chairman, chief executive officer, and president of
A.T. Massey Co., contributed $1,000—the statutory maximum—to
Benjamin’s campaign committee.56 Blankenship also gave $2.5 million to “And for the Sake of the Kids,” a political committee organized under section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code that made
independent expenditures in support of Benjamin and in opposition to
McGraw.57 Blankenship spent yet another $500,000 on his own independent expenditures—direct mail, television and newspaper advertising—promoting Benjamin’s candidacy.58 Blankenship’s donations
and spending in support of Benjamin amounted to more than the total
spent by all other Benjamin supporters and three times the amount
spent by Benjamin’s own campaign committee.59
56.
57.
58.
59.

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 873 (2009).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The 2004 election, which Benjamin won with fifty-three percent of
the vote, occurred as a lawsuit against Massey Coal was making its
way through the West Virginia courts.60 In 2002, a West Virginia jury
returned a verdict against Massey and awarded the Caperton plaintiffs
$50 million in compensatory and punitive damages.61 The plaintiffs
prevailed in 2004 and 2005 against post-trial motions brought by Massey, which ultimately filed an appeal with the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals. The Caperton plaintiffs moved to disqualify nowJustice Benjamin under the Due Process Clause and the West Virginia
Code of Judicial Conduct from participating in the case, claiming that
Blankenship’s campaign support for Benjamin created a conflict of
interest.62 Justice Benjamin denied the motion, declaring that no evidence had been presented that he could be anything but fair and impartial.63 Thereafter, the West Virginia Supreme Court, by a 3-2 vote
with Justice Benjamin in the majority, reversed the $50 million verdict
against Massey.64 The plaintiffs sought a rehearing and moved to
have Justice Benjamin recuse himself from participating in the decision to rehear. Justice Benjamin again declined to recuse.65 The court
granted the rehearing request, and the Caperton plaintiffs again
moved to have Benjamin recuse himself from participating in the rehearing. For the third time, Justice Benjamin declined to recuse and
the court again voted 3-2, with Justice Benjamin in the majority, to
reverse the jury verdict. The plaintiffs then sought review by the
United States Supreme Court, contending that given the “extraordinary amount” of campaign finance support he had received from Massey’s board chairman and principal officer, Justice Benjamin’s
repeated participation in the Massey case denied them an impartial
decision-maker in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.66
The Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote with Justice Kennedy writing for
the majority, agreed with the plaintiffs. According to Justice Kennedy, the combination of several factors gave rise to a “probability of
actual bias” such that Benjamin violated Caperton’s due process rights
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 873–874.
63. Id. at 874.
64. Id. at 875.
65. Id. Both sides filed disqualification motions aimed at three of the five justices who had
participated in deciding the appeal. Two justices – one who had voted for Caperton’s position
and one who had voted for Massey’s position – recused themselves from the rehearing, but
Justice Benjamin did not. He selected the replacements for the recused justices. Id. at 874–75.
66. Id. at 872.
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by refusing to recuse himself from the case.67 Justice Kennedy noted
the “extraordinary” financial support in absolute dollars, as a share of
the spending in support of Benjamin, and as a fraction of the total
spending in the election. He determined that Blankenship’s spending
had a “significant and disproportionate influence on the electoral outcome,” and he pointed to the “the temporal relationship between the
election and the pending case.”68 Like the circumstances of the case
itself, the decision was “extraordinary” in several respects.
First, the Court had never before determined that campaign support for a judicial candidate could trigger a finding that an elected
judge was unconstitutionally biased in favor of the supporter. As the
Court acknowledged, the Due Process Clause had previously been
held to require judicial recusal only in cases where the judge had a
financial interest in the outcome of the case or, more rarely, the judge
had a conflict arising from her participation in an earlier phase of the
case.69 Indeed, the Court had previously determined that claims of
improper partiality requiring recusal resulting from “matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, [and] remoteness of interest, would
seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion”70 and
not of constitutional moment. Unconstitutional bias in favor of a financial campaign supporter was something new.
Second, the Court emphasized “[t]his problem arises in the context
of judicial elections, a framework not presented in the precedents we
have reviewed and discussed.”71 Whereas White minimized the fact
that the election affected by the announce clause was judicial,
Caperton made that fact central. In elections for other offices, the
Court has dismissed the idea that independent spending could give the
spender some kind of corrupting or otherwise undue influence over
the officeholder benefited by the spending. Dissenting in McConnell
v. FEC,72 Justice Kennedy declared that the possibility of officeholder
“favoritism” to financial backers was not corruption, would not give
rise to the appearance of corruption, and so was not a constitutional
basis for limiting campaign money.73 He reiterated this point in his
majority opinion for the Court in Citizens United v. FEC,74 which was
decided the year after Caperton. Current Supreme Court campaign
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 885–87.
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 885–887.
Id. at 876–81.
Id. at 876 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)).
Id. at 881–82.
540 U.S. 93 (2003).
Id. at 297 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010).
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finance doctrine rejects the idea that there is anything improper about
an elected official favoring the interests of her campaign’s financial
supporters unless there is an outright quid pro quo between the financial supporter and the official.75 But central to Justice Kennedy’s
analysis in Caperton was his certainty that “Justice Benjamin would
. . . feel a debt of gratitude to Blankenship for his extraordinary efforts
to get him elected.”76 The Court held this “debt” created “a serious
risk of actual bias—based on objective and reasonable perceptions”77
that Justice Benjamin would be favorably disposed to Blankenship’s
interest in the case. The “serious risk of actual bias” meant that it was
unconstitutional for Justice Benjamin to participate in the Massey
Coal case.78
Justice Kennedy reiterated the crucial significance that Caperton involved a judicial election the following year in his opinion for the
Court in Citizens United, asserting that Caperton was no precedent
for limiting corporate independent spending concerning a presidential
candidate because Caperton involved a judge and not another category of elected official.79 As he stressed in Citizens United, Caperton
“was based on a litigant’s due process right to a fair trial before an
unbiased judge” and so did not provide any support for restricting a
litigant’s campaign speech.80 In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy repeated his view that “[f]avoritism and influence are . . . [un]avoidable
in representative politics. It is in the nature of an elected representative to favor certain policies, and, by necessary corollary, to favor the
voters and contributors who support those policies. . . . Democracy is
premised on responsiveness.”81 Judges may be elected, but that does
not make them “representatives,” at least not to the extent of allowing
them to favor litigants who had been major campaign finance
supporters.
75. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014) (“Constituents have the right to
support candidates who share their views and concerns. Representatives are not to follow constituent orders, but can be expected to be cognizant of and responsive to those concerns. Such
responsiveness is key to the very concept of self-governance through elected officials.”).
76. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 882.
77. Id. at 884.
78. Emphasizing just how novel the finding of an unconstitutional conflict of interest was,
Blankenship himself was not a party to the case, and Massey Coal – the actual party – had not
itself given or spent any funds to aid Benjamin. The majority treated Blankenship’s and Massey’s interests as equivalent. That makes some sense as Blankenship was Massey’s board chairman and principal officer. Id. at 873. However, they were legally distinct.
79. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 358 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
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Third, Caperton is not a First Amendment case. The opinion for the
Court never mentions the First Amendment. Nor was Caperton technically a campaign finance case, that is, a case dealing with restrictions
or requirements with respect to the use of campaign money. The issue
of whether Blankenship’s spending should have been or could be restricted never arose. Indeed, the Court ignored a foundational feature
of campaign finance law. Ordinarily, in campaign finance parlance
the term “contribution” refers to money given to a candidate or to an
intermediary—such as a political party or political action committee—
to be given to a candidate.82 Money spent by a candidate, party, or
independent group on direct efforts to communicate with, persuade,
or mobilize voters is called an “expenditure.”83 Contributions can be
limited because they raise the possibility of corruption or the appearance of corruption.84 Expenditures may not be limited because, the
Court has long contended, they pose no danger of corruption or its
appearance.85 But in Caperton Justice Kennedy blurred this crucial
campaign finance law distinction. He repeatedly referred to all of
Blankenship’s campaign spending as “contributions,” although only
the $1,000 Blankenship gave to the Benjamin campaign committee
was a “contribution within the meaning of campaign finance doctrine.”86 Virtually all of the $3 million Blankenship spent to promote
Benjamin or attack McGraw consisted of independent expenditures,
which are constitutionally immune from limitation because the Court
has determined that they cannot be a cause of corruption, or the appearance of corruption.87 Justice Kennedy, who has authored multiple opinions in campaign finance cases,88 surely knew the difference
between contributions and expenditures. Perhaps because Caperton
did not implicate limitations on campaign money but only the consequences for a judge who benefited from so much of it, the First
Amendment did not come into play and so the distinction did not
matter. The association of “contributions” with “corruption” in campaign finance doctrine, however, may have given the majority opinion
82. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1976).
83. Id. at 19–20.
84. Id. at 26–29.
85. Id. at 45–48, 53, 55–56; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357–60.
86. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872–73, 884–86 (2009).
87. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45–48.
88. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93,
286–350 (2003) (concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Gov’t PAC, 500 U.S. 377, 405–10 (2000) (dissenting); Colorado Rep. Fed. Elec. Camp.
Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 626–31 (1996) (concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
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some additional rhetorical heft, even if, from a campaign finance law
perspective, the use of the term “contribution” was misleading.
Caperton is a due process case. Its focus is on the post-election behavior of judges, not on anything a judicial candidate may say or
spend—or may not say or spend—in her election campaign, or on anything the candidate’s supporters could say or spend. As Justice Kennedy stressed in Citizens United, “Caperton’s holding was limited to
the rule that the judge must be recused, not that the litigant’s political
speech could be banned.”89 To be sure, the “rule” that emerges from
Caperton is quite uncertain. The Court repeatedly emphasizes the
“extreme” facts and “extraordinary” circumstances driving its holding.
By my count Justice Kennedy uses “extraordinary” four times90 and
“extreme” eight times91 to describe Blankenship’s spending and its asserted impact on the election, in tandem with the pendency of the
Massey case before Benjamin’s court. Justice Kennedy’s premise that
Blankenship’s spending “had a significant and disproportionate influence on the electoral outcome” is debatable.92 Benjamin won by
more than six percent of the vote;93 he was endorsed by nearly every
major newspaper in the state;94 and McGraw injured his chances by a
highly intemperate Labor Day speech in Racine, West Virginia, that
became known as the “Scream from Racine” and was prominently
featured in campaign ads against him.95 Moreover, as Chief Justice
Roberts demonstrated by the forty questions he asked in his dissent,96
it is not at all clear from Caperton how much spending or from what
sources would trigger due process concern, or whether recusal would
also be required if the litigant who spent heavily in an election had a
case before the benefited judge that implicated a broad social, ideological or policy issue, rather than the narrow economic interest of a
specific firm like that at issue in Caperton.97 Nor is it clear whether, if
he had been reelected, Justice McGraw would have had to recuse because of a presumptive campaign-spending-based bias against Mas89. 558 U.S. at 360.
90. See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 872, 882, 886, 887.
91. Id. at 886, 887 (five times), 888 (twice).
92. Id. at 885. Justice Kennedy’s opinion uses the phrase “significant and disproportionate” to
characterize Blankenship’s impact on the election four times. See id. at 884–86.
93. Id. at 901 (dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Roberts).
94. Id. at 902.
95. Chris Dickerson, McGraw Suit ‘Must Be’ Referring to Racine Speech, WEST VIRGINIA RECORD (May 12, 2006), http://wvrecord.com/stories/510590311-mcgraw-suit-must-be-referring-toracine-speech. Chief Justice Roberts referred obliquely to this speech in his dissent. Caperton,
558 U.S. at 902.
96. Caperton, 558 U.S. at 893–98.
97. Id. at 894–95.
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sey.98 It is also uncertain whether the due process concern is limited
to campaign spending or could also reach “a debt of gratitude for endorsements by newspapers, interest groups, politicians, or
celebrities.”99
Although Chief Justice Roberts viewed with alarm “the inherently
boundless nature” of Caperton’s “rule”100 and predicted that the
courts would soon be “forced to deal with a wide variety of Caperton
motions,”101 it appears that few such motions have followed102 and the
case has had little direct impact on the recusal of elected judges.103
More surprisingly, perhaps, although the Caperton majority avoided
any mention of the First Amendment, the case has had an impact on
First Amendment challenges to the canons governing judicial campaign behavior. In cases in which state judges or judicial candidates
claimed that state canons restricting their partisan political activities
(such as endorsing a candidate for non-judicial office or holding a
leadership position in a partisan political organization) are unconstitutional, federal courts of appeals have invoked Caperton for the proposition that states “have a compelling interest in developing, and
indeed are required by the Fourteenth Amendment to develop” an
independent and fair judiciary.104 Their decisions have also noted that
public confidence in the judiciary—which “depends on its reputation
for impartiality”—is promoted by “rules that keep judges out of active
politics.”105 Indeed, in the hands of some courts, Caperton has taken
on new life by providing authority for the determination that the “appearance of impartiality” is a compelling justification for restrictions
on the political activities of judges,106 even though that concern had
gotten short shrift in White. The Eighth Circuit decision in Wersal v.
Sexton,107 citing Caperton as establishing that the appearance of judicial impartiality is a compelling state interest, is particularly striking
as that court also invoked Caperton to reject the idea that recusal
98. Id. at 895 (question 18).
99. Id. (question 20). For another very critical assessment of Caperton, see Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutionalizing Judicial Ethics: Judicial Elections After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, Caperton, and Citizens United, 64 ARK. L. REV. 1, 41–57 (2011).
100. 556 U.S. at 899.
101. Id. at 900.
102. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, et al., Caperton and the Courts: Did the Floodgates Open? 18
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL. 481, 494 (Professor Bradley Smith finds “it has indeed been rare
to have Caperton motions.”)
103. Caperton may have served as the impetus for some states to revise their recusal rules.
See id. at 486–87 (comments of Professor Keith Swisher).
104. Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 980 (7th Cir. 2010).
105. Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 712 (7th Cir. 2010).
106. Wersal v. Sexton, 674 F.3d 1010, 1022 (8th Cir. 2012).
107. 674 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2012).
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would be a less restrictive, and thus, constitutionally required, alternative to a speech limitation.108 The court found “Caperton illustrative
of the unworkability of recusal” in certain circumstances.109
“[R]ecusal serves as an after-the-fact remedy that is insufficient to
cure the damage to the appearance of impartiality.”110
Caperton has, thus, become a medium for smuggling Justice Ginsburg’s focus on due process concerns into the First Amendment analysis of restrictions on judicial campaign conduct. To be sure, the
impartiality threatened in Caperton was precisely the kind of impartiality Justice Scalia in White had been willing to accept as a compelling
state interest—impartiality with respect to the specific parties in a specific case. Caperton did not implicate the other arguable impartiality
concerns of preconceptions with respect to legal issues or lack of
open-mindedness. But the lower courts citing Caperton opened up its
potential significance by framing the issue as not about the bias vel
non of the judge with respect to the parties to a case, but rather about
the crucial importance of the appearance of judicial impartiality, that
is, the public’s belief that its judiciary is impartial.
The post-Caperton appeals court cases that factored Caperton’s due
process focus into a compelling interest in the appearance of judicial
impartiality tended to involve restrictions on political activity in support of political parties or other candidates and not the judicial candidate’s own campaign. But in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, the
Supreme Court extended the due process concern into a First Amendment analysis of a restriction of a judicial candidate’s own campaign
behavior.
C. Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar
In Williams-Yulee, the Supreme Court, in yet another 5-4 split, rejected a First Amendment challenge to the canon in the Code of Judicial Conduct adopted by the Florida Supreme Court that prohibits
judges and judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign
funds. The Court held, as White had assumed,111 that restrictions on
judicial campaign speech are subject to strict judicial scrutiny,112
thereby requiring that a restriction on the solicitation of campaign
contributions be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest in
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 1027–31.
Id. at 1031.
Id.
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002).
Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1665 (2015).
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order to survive a constitutional challenge.113 Then the Court, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, did a “rare”114 thing and held that
Florida had demonstrated that its speech restriction was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.115 In so doing, the Court’s
application of strict scrutiny was considerably less strict than the analysis undertaken in White thirteen years earlier.
First, Chief Justice Roberts quickly found “preserving public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary” to be a compelling state interest.116 Indeed, he twice cited Caperton—for which he had written the
lead dissent—to make that point.117 Unlike Justice Scalia in White,
Chief Justice Roberts made little effort to define “integrity” or its relationship to the other judicial virtues the Chief Justice deemed essential—“impartiality” or “independence.”118 Nor did he make much of
an effort to assess what makes for public confidence in the judiciary—
the actual compelling interest—which he acknowledged is “intangible.”119 Rather, he seemed comfortable with the fact that “[t]he concept of public confidence in judicial integrity does not easily reduce to
precise definition, nor does it lend itself to proof by documentary
record.”120
Second, he immediately determined that the ban on personal solicitation served the interests in judicial integrity and the appearance
thereof, again without the kind of evidence Justice Scalia had demanded in White. Instead the link between the restriction and the
interests served was “intuitive,”121 and like the judicial integrity interest itself needed no empirical proof.
113. Id. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court commanded only four votes for these
points. See id. at 1662, 1664–65. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, who joined in the judgment
sustaining the personal solicitation ban and in the rest of the Court’s analysis, would not have
applied strict scrutiny. See id. at 1673–75. However, the four justices who dissented from the
Court’s holding—Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito—agreed with the plurality that
strict scrutiny applied. Id. at 1676 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Id. at 1685 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Id.
at 1685–86 (Alito, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 1665–66.
115. Williams-Yulee is only the third time that the Court has found that a measure challenged
as a violation of the First Amendment’s protection of speech survived strict scrutiny and only the
second election regulation to so survive. See, e.g., Noah B. Lindell, Williams-Yulee and the
Anomaly of Campaign Finance Law, 126 YALE L.J. 1577, 1577 (2017). The other election law
case was Burson v. Freeman, which upheld a ban on electioneering at polling places. 504 U.S.
191 (1992). The non-election case was Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project. 561 U.S. 1, 25–39
(2010).
116. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1666.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1671.
120. Id. at 1667.
121. Id. at 1666.
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Third, the Court rejected claims that the canon failed strict scrutiny’s narrow tailoring requirement. Indeed, the personal solicitation
ban was arguably both overbroad and underinclusive. From the overbreadth perspective, the restriction was not limited to the solicitation
of lawyers or litigants, but proscribed the solicitation of anyone. A
judicial candidate could not solicit even her own mother for funds.
Nor was the ban limited to in-person solicitations, which could be seen
as coercive or leading directly to favoritism to donors, but also applied
to internet postings and mass mailings, where there was no personal
contact between candidate and donor. Moreover, there was an arguably less restrictive way of dealing with possible favoritism to a donor
in a case in which the donor has an interest—recusal.
The underinclusiveness argument was also strong. The rule provided that the solicitation of campaign funds for a judicial candidate
could be undertaken by a committee established by the candidate.122
But nothing prevented the candidate from learning which potential
donors were solicited or which ones made donations. Indeed, Florida
specifically permits judicial candidates to write thank you notes to
campaign donors.123
However, Chief Justice Roberts waved away both sets of objections. The restriction was not overly broad. Florida could conclude
that there was something especially problematic about all personal appeals by judges and judicial candidates for campaign money: “Florida
has reasonably determined that personal appeals for money by a judicial candidate inherently create an appearance of impropriety that
may cause the public to lose confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.”124 Nor was recusal a less restrictive alternative. A recusal requirement “would disable many jurisdictions”—presumably smaller
jurisdictions with one or only a small number of judges125—and, quoting his Caperton dissent, Chief Justice Roberts expressed the concern
that “a flood of postelection recusal motions” could itself erode public
confidence in the judiciary.126 The canon was also determined to not
be underinclusive. The Court emphasized that Florida could treat
personal solicitation as “the conduct most likely to undermine public
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary”127 and as “categorically
different and [a] more severe risk of undermining public confi122. Id. at 1663.
123. Id. at 1668.
124. Id. at 1671.
125. See, e.g., Jeffrey T. Fiut, Recusal and Recompense: Amending New York Recusal Law in
Light of the Judicial Pay Raise Controversy, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1597, 1601 (2009).
126. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1671–72.
127. Id. at 1668.
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dence”128 than solicitation by a committee even though the candidate
is aware of the committee’s work and potential donors know of the
candidate’s awareness. Personal solicitation “creates pressure for the
recipient to comply, and it does so in a way that solicitation by a third
party does not.”129
Justice Alito’s sarcastic dissent snarled that the Florida rule “is
about as narrowly tailored as a burlap bag. . . . If this rule can be
characterized as narrowly tailored, then narrow tailoring has no meaning . . . .”130 Without getting into the merits of Justice Alito’s critique131 it is clear that Chief Justice Roberts adopted a much looser
approach to narrow tailoring than Justice Scalia had in White. Indeed,
the Chief Justice was relatively candid about that. In rebutting the
underinclusiveness claim, he asserted a “State need not address all aspects of a problem in one fell swoop.”132 In defending against the
overbreadth argument he explained that narrow tailoring does not
mean “perfect tailoring.”133
Running through the Court’s opinion and undergirding its deferential approach to the Florida canon was Chief Justice Roberts’ insistence that judicial elections are different from what he called
“political elections.” Justice Roberts urged that “[j]udges are not politicians, even when they come to the bench by way of the ballot. And a
State’s decision to elect its judiciary does not compel it to treat judicial
candidates like campaigners for political office.”134 As Justice Kennedy had done in distinguishing Citizens United in Caperton, Chief
Justice Roberts emphasized that unlike other elected officials, an
elected judge “is not to follow the preferences of his supporters, or
provide any special consideration to his campaign donors.”135 As a
128. Id. at 1669.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1685.
131. For more critical appraisals of the Court’s application of strict scrutiny to the Florida
personal solicitation ban, see, e.g., Clay Hansen & J. Joshua Wheeler, Free Speech, Elections, and
Judicial Integrity in an Age of Exceptionalism, 31 J. L.& POL. 457 (2016); Michael Linton Wright,
Comment, Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar: Judicial Elections, Impartiality and the Threat to Free
Speech, 93 DENV. L. REV. 551, 569–72 (2016); Lijun Zhang, Paved with Good Intentions: The
U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1483
(2016). Also noteworthy is leading First Amendment advocate Floyd Abrams’s comment that
the Court’s strict scrutiny analysis “is enough to make First Amendment aficionados wish that
the Court had never decided that strict scrutiny applied at all.” Floyd Abrams, Symposium:
When strict scrutiny ceased to be strict, SCOTUS BLOG (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.scotusblog.
com/2015/04/symposium-when-strict-scrutiny-ceased-to-be-strict/.
132. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1669.
133. Id. at 1671 (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 209 (1992)).
134. Id. at 1662.
135. Id. at 1667.
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result, state regulation of judicial elections can go beyond the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption, which are the
sole bases for campaign finance restrictions in “political elections,”
and may aim more broadly to protect public confidence in judicial
integrity. The Chief Justice went so far as to claim that White provided support for the position that “our precedents applying the First
Amendment to political elections have little bearing on the issues
here,” although his main citation for that was Justice Ginsburg’s White
dissent.136 But whether or not the Court properly read White—which
seemed far more intent on requiring that the constitutional doctrines
applicable to elections generally and election speech in particular presumptively apply to judicial elections—Williams-Yulee clearly sets a
tone of openness to treating judicial elections differently.
As with White, the main significance of Williams-Yulee may be its
analytical stance rather than its holding. To be sure, unlike the announce clause invalidated in White, bans on personal solicitation of
campaign funds are widespread, with similar restrictions in place in
thirty of the thirty-nine states that elect judges.137 Moreover, before
the Court’s decision the constitutional status of those bans was quite
uncertain. One article published after oral argument but before the
Court’s decision found that two federal courts of appeals and three
state supreme courts (including Florida’s) had rejected constitutional
challenges to the bans, while four other federal courts of appeals had
held the bans were unconstitutional.138 If the decision had gone the
other way it would have affected the law governing judicial campaigns
in many states. On the other hand, given the universal availability of
the campaign committee option and the lack of limits on what a judicial candidate can know about the donors to her committee, it is
doubtful whether the case will have much practical impact on judicial
campaign fundraising. However, the case does appear to invite more
deferential judicial review of state restrictions on judicial campaign
activities and has been used by lower courts to sustain various restrictions on judicial candidates.

136. Id. (citing Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S 765, 783, 805 (2002)). The second
citation is to Justice Ginsburg’s dissent. The first is to the language in the majority opinion stating “we neither assert nor imply that the First Amendment requires campaigns for judicial office
to sound the same as those for legislative office”—not exactly a ringing declaration that judicial
elections may be regulated differently.
137. Id. at 1663.
138. See Steele Trotter, Williams-Yulee and the Changing Landscape of Judicial Campaigns,
28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 947, 948 n.9 (2015) (citing cases).
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Relying on Williams-Yulee’s compelling interest and narrow tailoring analyses, the Ninth Circuit in Wolfson v. Concannon139 rejected a
constitutional challenge to the provisions of the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct barring judges and judicial candidates from soliciting
funds for other candidates or political organizations, from publicly endorsing candidates for other public offices, from making speeches on
behalf of other candidates or political organizations, or from taking an
active part in any political campaign. The state’s interest in public
confidence in the judiciary was found sufficient to support all the restrictions and, within the spirit of Williams-Yulee, they were all held to
be narrowly tailored and the least restrictive means of attaining the
state’s goals.140
The Sixth Circuit has also repeatedly drawn on Williams-Yulee to
sustain restrictions on judicial political activity against First Amendment attack. In Winter v. Wolnitzek,141 the court upheld the Kentucky
Code of Judicial Conduct’s bans on a judicial candidate making a contribution to a political organization or candidate;142 endorsing or opposing a candidate for public office;143 acting as a leader or holding
any office in a political organization;144 and knowingly or with reckless
disregard for the truth making false statements on matters material to
a campaign during a campaign.145 With respect to the last provision,
the court acknowledged that a different Sixth Circuit panel had just
invalidated an Ohio law banning false statements that applied to nonjudicial candidates. Citing Williams-Yulee, the Winter panel reasoned
that the different treatment of the judicial candidate false statement
ban was justified because Kentucky’s interest “in preserving public
confidence in the honesty and integrity of its judiciary is . . . more
compelling than Ohio’s purported interest in protecting voters in
other elected races from misinformation.”146
A Montana federal district court similarly invoked Williams-Yulee
to rebuff a judicial candidate’s challenge to a Montana canon prohibiting false statements by or about judicial candidates.147 The court
found that the state’s compelling interest in preserving and promoting
139. Wolfson v. Concannon, 811 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2016).
140. Id. at 1181–86.
141. 834 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2016).
142. Id. at 690–91.
143. Id. at 691–92.
144. Id. at 692–93
145. Id. at 693.
146. Id. The Ohio law also swept more broadly than the Kentucky measure, applying to all
false statements, whereas the Kentucky law applied only to false statements of material facts,
and the Ohio law imposed liability on publishers, not just speakers. Id.
147. Myers v. Thompson, 192 F. Supp. 3d 1129 (D. Mont. 2016).
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public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary supported a ban on
candidate false statements and that the restriction was neither overbroad nor underinclusive.148
A second Sixth Circuit panel relied on Williams-Yulee’s compelling
interest in “maintaining public perception of judicial integrity and impartiality” in sustaining Ohio’s prohibition on listing judicial candidate
party affiliations on the general election ballot.149 The court also invoked Williams-Yulee’s rather loose approach to narrow tailoring in
finding that this limited minimization of partisanship in judicial elections150 was not fatally underinclusive.151 A third Sixth Circuit decision, O’Toole v. O’Connor,152 relied on Williams-Yulee’s compelling
interest and narrow tailoring analyses to sustain against First Amendment attack a provision of the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct limiting
the time period in which a judicial candidate’s campaign committee
may solicit and receive campaign contributions.153 That panel also rejected an argument that the application of a fundraising time limit
only to judicial campaigns and not to other political organizations violated the Equal Protection Clause, citing Williams-Yulee’s “enunciation of the distinction between judicial campaigns and non-judicial
political campaigns.”154
To be sure, none of these decisions call into question White’s determination that judicial candidates are free to announce their views on
disputed legal questions. The Ninth Circuit in Wolfson made that
point in confirming that a judicial candidate has the right to speak
concerning her own campaign. The Arizona canons at issue limited
only the candidate’s freedom to participate in other candidates’ campaigns.155 The Sixth Circuit in Winter made the point even more
strongly in invalidating Kentucky’s ban on a judicial candidate
“campaigning as a member of a political organization,” such as a political party, and on making speeches for a political organization, which
the court read as barring the candidate from declaring that he or she is
“for the Republican Party.”156 Both provisions were seen as unconsti148. Id. at 1139–41.
149. Ohio Council 8 Fed’n State, Cty., & Mun. Emps. v. Husted, 814 F.3d 329, 340 (6th Cir.
2016).
150. Judicial candidates must first compete in partisan primaries; the candidates may identify
with their political parties during their campaigns; and the parties may campaign for and advertise on behalf of their candidates. Id. at 332–33.
151. Id. at 340.
152. 802 F.3d 783 (6th Cir. 2015).
153. Id. at 789–91.
154. Id. at 792.
155. Wolfson v. Concannon, 811 F.3d 1176, 1185 (9th Cir. 2016).
156. 834 F.3d 681, 689 (6th Cir. 2016).
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tutionally interfering with the candidate’s White-protected ability to
“tak[e] a stance on ‘matters of current public importance.’”157 As
Judge Sutton put it at the conclusion of his Winter opinion, although
“treating elections for the courts just like elections for the political
branches does not make sense,” a state that elects its judges also “has
no right to suspend the First Amendment in the process.”158
D. A Court Divided
Over the last two decades the Supreme Court has heard three cases
dealing with speech and campaign finance in judicial elections, and
each time the Court divided 5-4. The Court’s “conservatives” have
generally opposed restrictions on judicial candidates. Justices Scalia
and Thomas voted against the restrictions in all three cases. Chief
Justice Rehnquist did so in the one case he heard (White) and Justice
Alito did so in the two cases he heard (Caperton and Williams-Yulee).
The Court’s “liberals” have generally supported regulation of judicial
campaigns. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer voted for regulation in all
three cases. Justices Stevens and Souter did so in the two cases they
heard (White and Caperton), and Justices Sotomayor and Kagan did
so in the one case they heard (Williams-Yulee). This divide tends to
map the Court’s 5-4 division in campaign finance cases generally—
with two anomalies.159 Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts
have both been vigorous critics of campaign finance regulation and
both have consistently been part of the Court’s 5-4 majority that has
repeatedly cut back on or invalidated campaign finance laws since the
mid-2000’s. Yet in the judicial campaign setting each cast the dispositive vote once, and wrote the majority opinion for, the regulatory side.

157. Id. at 688.
158. Id. at 695.
159. Another arguable anomaly is Justice O’Connor, who frequently voted to reject challenges to campaign finance laws but voted with the anti-regulatory majority in White. Justice
O’Connor was deeply troubled by judicial elections generally, expressing her concern that “the
very practice of electing judges” undermines the compelling interest in an impartial judiciary.
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002). However, she appeared to conclude that having “chosen to select its judges through contested popular elections,” the First
Amendment rules ordinarily applicable to contested elections would apply. Id. at 792. According to Professor Geyh, after she retired, Justice O’Connor “second-guessed her own conclusions
and embarked on a campaign to ameliorate what she regarded as the deleterious effects of judicial elections.” Charles Gardner Geyh, The Jekyll and Hyde of First Amendment Limits on the
Regulation of Judicial Campaign Speech, 68 VAND. L. REV. En Banc 83, 92 (2015). In any event,
White was not a campaign finance case so it is not clear that her White vote is in tension with her
other votes concerning election regulation.
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However, each also sharply disagreed with the other in the two cases
on which they both sat (Caperton and Williams-Yulee).160
Of the two, the bigger anomaly is surely Chief Justice Roberts and
his vote in Williams-Yulee. As previously noted, Justice Kennedy’s
Caperton opinion avoided any mention of the First Amendment and,
as he subsequently stressed in Citizens United, his Caperton opinion
provided no basis for limiting judicial campaign speech or spending.
In his view, judges may have a higher duty to avoid the appearance of
partiality than do other elected officials, but judicial elections are to
be run by the same rules as other elections. This theme is also central
to his separate opinions in both White and Williams-Yulee.
By contrast, Chief Justice Roberts grounded his Williams-Yulee
analysis in the First Amendment and confirmed that strict scrutiny applies to restrictions on judicial candidate speech. Yet he strongly asserted that not only are judges different from other elected officials,
but the special status of judges allows states to treat judicial elections
differently and to subject them to more speech-restrictive rules.161
Given Williams-Yulee, it is a little hard to understand the vehemence
of his Caperton dissent. Perhaps it was the lack of a clear-cut “rule” in
the Court’s “totality of the circumstances” opinion. Perhaps it was the
concern that by inviting constitutionally-grounded recusal motions
Caperton would ultimately undermine public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary, which, as his Williams-Yulee opinion indicates, is
for him a consideration of the highest order. Yet, his Caperton dissent
notwithstanding, his Williams-Yulee opinion clearly reflects the integration of Caperton’s due process concern into the First Amendment
analysis.
Moreover, although the issue in Williams-Yulee was a narrow one,
the Chief Justice’s opinion is potentially quite open-ended, arguably
more so than Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Caperton. In Caperton, the
Court tracked White in focusing on the compelling interest in avoiding
judicial bias for or against a party in a specific case. Caperton extended the grounds of what could constitute bias, but its sole focus
was on party-specific bias. Williams-Yulee, instead, focused on the
broader and more intangible concepts of judicial integrity and the
public perception of it. It sustained a restriction not tied to preventing
bias for or against a specific litigant but aimed instead at promoting
the legitimacy of the judiciary generally. Coupled with its loosened
approach to the narrow tailoring requirement, Williams-Yulee’s more
160. Justice Kennedy also sat on White case and voted with the anti-regulatory majority in
that case.
161. Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1667, 1672 (2015).
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capacious definition of compelling interest may enable many more restrictions to pass constitutional muster than would have been the case
if White were still the lead First Amendment precedent. That is certainly how it has been used in the handful of federal court decisions
that have applied the case over the past two years.162
Of course, none of these cases support any limits on judicial campaign speech, other than the very specific speech of a candidate expressly asking for a contribution, or any limits on spending by either
the candidate or independent groups.
IV. REGULATING DARK MONEY

IN

JUDICIAL ELECTIONS

A. What is Dark Money, and What Makes it Dark?
The term “dark money” refers to election campaign expenditures
by independent groups that do not disclose the sources of the funds
used to pay for those expenditures.163 Some of the expenditures, particularly broadcast advertising that focuses on a candidate, are commonly subject to reporting requirements, and the name and address of
the entity that formally pays for the expenditure is typically subject to
disclosure. But the identities of the donors, and the amounts given by
individual donors, are not disclosed.
How can this occur even when the jurisdiction has laws requiring
the disclosure of the identities of, and sums given by, campaign donors? There are two reasons. First, most donor disclosure laws focus
on “political committees,” which consist of candidate campaign committees, political party committees, and other committees that cross
some threshold of engagement in electioneering.164 Some committees
engage in both electioneering concerning candidates and political ac162. See, e.g., Winter v. Wolnitzek, 834 F.3d, 681 692–93 (6th Cir. 2016) (relying on WilliamsYulee in sustaining provisions banning judicial candidate endorsements and acting as the leader
of a political organization, and penalizing false statements by judicial candidates); O’Toole v.
O’Connor, 802 F.3d 783, 789 (6th Cir. 2015) (relying on Williams-Yulee in sustaining provision
limiting time period for solicitation and receipt of campaign contributions); Wolfson v. Concannon, 811 F.3d 1176, 1181–86 (9th Cir. 2016) (relying on Williams-Yulee in sustaining provisions
concerning personal solicitation, endorsements, and campaigning for other candidates); Myers v.
Thompson, 192 F. Supp. 3d 1129, 1138–42 (2016) (relying on Williams-Yulee in sustaining provision barring false statements about judicial candidates); Ohio Council 8 Fed’n State, Cty., &
Mun. Emps. v. Husted, 814 F.3d 329, 340 (6th Cir. 2016) (relying on Williams-Yulee in sustaining
Ohio law barring indication of a judicial candidate’s party affiliation on the general election
ballot).
163. See, e.g., Dark Money Basics, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://www.open
secrets.org/dark-money/basics (last visited Jan. 27, 2018).
164. See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 30101(4) (defining “political committee” for purposes of federal
campaign finance law), §§ 30102, 30103, 30104 (tying organizational, registration, and reporting
requirements to political committee status).
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tivity that addresses issues more broadly. Committees that engage in
independent spending (i.e. spending that is not coordinated with a
candidate) will be subject to donor disclosure requirements only if
their electioneering spending concerning candidates crosses a certain
dollar threshold or a certain fraction of their overall spending.165 Second, some laws require the disclosure of the donors financing electioneering expenditures above a certain threshold amount even if the
organization paying for the expenditure is not a political committee.166
The Supreme Court, however, has narrowed the definition of electioneering for the purposes of campaign finance regulation. The Court’s
definition includes only communications that expressly advocate for
or against the election of a clearly identified candidate, and broadcast
communications in the immediate pre-election period that clearly
name a candidate even if they do not engage in express advocacy.167
Communications that sharply criticize a candidate, but avoid the
“magic words” of express advocacy outside the immediate pre-election period, are not considered to be electioneering.168 Thus, any donations specifically funding such communications do not have to be
disclosed. Moreover, such expenditures are not counted in determining whether the organization’s expenditures cross the threshold that
triggers treating the organization as a political committee.
B. How May Dark Money Be Regulated in Non-Judicial Elections?
Starting with Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court has consistently
emphasized the informational benefits of donor disclosure in enabling
voters to evaluate candidates. By informing voters about the sources
of a candidate’s funds, disclosure “alert[s] the voter to the interests to
165. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976) (noting that a committee, other than a
candidate’s committee or political party committee, will be subject to federal campaign finance
reporting requirements if its “major purpose” is the nomination or election of a candidate);
Yamada v. Snipes, 786 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2015) (sustaining Hawaii law applying reporting and
disclosure requirements to committees that raise or spend more than $1,000 for electoral purposes in an election cycle); Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2011) (sustaining Maine law applying political committee status and reporting requirements to committees
that raise or spend more than $5000 for election purposes in an election cycle).
166. See, e.g., Delaware Strong Families v. Attorney General, 793 F.3d 304 (3d. Cir. 2015)
(sustaining application of Delaware law requiring disclosures by organization that spend over a
threshold amount on electioneering communications), cert. denied sub nom. Delaware Strong
Families v. Denn, 579 U.S. ___ (2016).
167. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 43–44. See generally Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing
the Elections/Politics Line, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1751 (1999).
168. Id. In McConnell v. FEC, the Supreme Court sustained Congress’s determination in the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 that for purposes of the definition of “electioneering
communications” broader than express advocacy the immediate pre-election period is thirty
days before a primary and sixty days before a general election. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
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which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate[s]
predictions of future performance in office.”169 The voter information
value of donor disclosure is even more important for independent
committees that typically operate under meaningless names like
“Americans for Prosperity” or “American Action Network,” which
tell the voters nothing about what the committee stands for or may be
downright misleading.170
The Court reiterated its commitment to donor disclosure by independent committees in Citizens United. Although Citizens United’s
spending could not be limited, it could be required to disclose the
identities of the donors who paid for its television broadcasts that
mentioned candidate Hillary Clinton in the pre-election period even
though its ads did not include express advocacy. The Court declared
that “the public has an interest in knowing who is speaking about a
candidate shortly before an election.”171 Moreover, although the
Court in Buckley construed the Federal Election Campaign Act’s
(“FECA”) definition of “political committee” to apply only to organizations with the “major purpose”172 of supporting or opposing candidates in federal elections,173 it is not clear whether the “major
purpose” standard is constitutionally required for state disclosure
laws. In McConnell v. FEC, the Court held that Buckley’s definition
of election-related spending for purposes of FECA’s disclosure requirement as “express advocacy” was a matter of “statutory interpretation, not a first principle of constitutional law,174 so that Congress
could go further and subject “electioneering communications”—defined as broadcast ads that refer to a candidate in a defined pre-election period—to disclosure. Several federal appeals courts have
upheld state laws setting a much lower threshold than “major purpose” for imposing disclosure requirements on independent spenders.175 There is also a good argument that for disclosure purposes the
169. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67.
170. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Updating Disclosure for the New Era of Independent Spending, 27 J. L. & POL. 683, 691–92 (2012).
171. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 369 (2010).
172. The Supreme Court has never defined “major purpose,” but in federal cases it has been
treated as requiring that a majority of an organization’s fundraising or spending be for federal
election purposes. See, e.g., Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. FEC, 209 F.
Supp. 3d 77 (D.D.C. 2016) (considering the question of the applicable time frame for determining an organization’s major purpose).
173. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79.
174. 540 U.S. 93, 190 (2003).
175. See, e.g., Yamada v. Snipes, 786 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2015); Center for Individual Freedom
v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464 (7th Cir. 2012); Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 669 F.3d 34 (1st Cir.
2012); Human Life of Washington, Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010). But see N.C.
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broader definition of “electioneering communication” endorsed by
the Court in McConnell could be extended beyond the broadcast media covered by the federal statute before the Court in McConnell to
include other media, such as print, direct mail, and telephone
banks.176 Although few jurisdictions have adopted them, Citizens
United signals that relatively broad campaign finance disclosure laws
are likely to pass constitutional muster.177
On the other hand, there is at present zero prospect of limiting
“dark money” or any other independent spending in executive or legislative elections. With the sole exception of one decision sustaining
limits on corporate and union independent spending178—which was
overturned in Citizens United179—the Court has consistently invalidated limits on independent spending. Thus, Citizens United firmly
establishes the unconstitutionality of limits on independent spending
for the foreseeable future. Dark money can be made less dark, but it
cannot be limited.
C. Can Dark Money Be More Regulated in Judicial Elections?
There are three possible types of regulation of dark money in judicial elections: disclosure, limits, and recusal.
1. Disclosure
As I just suggested, there is a strong doctrinal basis for requiring
significant donor disclosure by dark money groups in all elections.
Lower courts have indicated that electioneering need not be the dominant purpose of a group in order to trigger a disclosure requirement.
The Supreme Court has made clear that disclosure need not be limited to ads engaged in express advocacy. To be sure, not many jurisRight to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 247 (4th Cir. 2008). See generally Briffault, supra note 170,
at 692–95.
176. See id. at 699–707.
177. See also John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010). Disclosure is one area where the
death of Justice Scalia and his replacement by Justice Gorsuch could affect the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence. Although strongly hostile to most campaign finance regulation, Justice Scalia was
a strong proponent of disclosure, famously remarking that disclosure “is a price our people have
traditionally been willing to pay for self-governance. Requiring people to stand up in public for
their political acts fosters civic courage, without which democracy is doomed.” See id. at 228
(concurring in the judgment). It is unclear where Justice Gorsuch stands on disclosure. However, Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts have also supported disclosure laws, so, joined
by the Court’s “liberals” there is probably still a majority for disclosure. Cf. Independence Inst.
v. FEC, 137 S. Ct. 1204 (2017), aff’g mem. Independence Inst. v. FEC, 216 F. Supp. 3d 176
(D.D.C. 2016) (three-judge court rejects claim by non-profit organization that its advertising
constituted issue advocacy exempt from disclosure though it referred to specific candidates).
178. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 662 (1990).
179. 558 U.S. at 365.
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dictions have gone to the constitutional limit for disclosure in
elections generally. Arguments about the special nature of judicial
elections would not be needed to support effective disclosure of dark
money donors in judicial contests, although they might be politically
helpful.
A related question is whether it would be constitutionally permissible to have enhanced disclosure for independent committees that
spend only on judicial elections, and not for independent committees
participating in other elections. The Sixth Circuit’s rejection in
O’Toole v. O’Connor of an Equal Protection argument challenging
more restrictive regulation of judicial elections suggests that such a
targeted disclosure requirement could be constitutionally viable. This
is significant given the generally lower availability of voter information concerning candidates in judicial elections compared to other
races. On the other hand, such an enhanced disclosure requirement
would have to be implemented by statute. Most of the special restrictions on judicial campaign conduct are found in the canons of judicial
conduct that are adopted by state supreme courts, but the courts can
regulate only by court rule and only with respect to judges, judicial
candidates, and possibly lawyers. They cannot regulate other campaign actors, such as political parties and independent committees.
2. Limits
Limits on spending in elections generally are flatly unconstitutional.
Can judicial elections be a special case? Can the compelling interest
in judicial integrity and the appearance of judicial integrity support
such limits? Probably not.180 In the Supreme Court’s vision, campaign expenditures benefit from strong First Amendment protection
because they communicate arguments, ideas, and information to the
voters. According to the Court, independent spending, that is spending undertaken by organizations without prearrangement or coordination with a candidate, poses no danger of corruption or the
appearance of corruption, which the Court has said is the only justification for limiting campaign money.181 Is the spending on campaign
communications by independent groups in judicial races less constitutionally protected than in other elections? Surely not.
Independent spending in judicial elections is as much about the
communication of views on matters of public importance as is inde180. See, e.g., Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 1998) (invalidating judicial candidate
spending limit adopted by Ohio Supreme Court as amendment to the Ohio Code of Judicial
Conduct).
181. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45–47; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359–61.
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pendent spending in all other elections. White confirms this, and even
Williams-Yulee emphasized that the canon it upheld restricted only “a
narrow slice of speech”182 and asserted that “[j]udicial candidates
have a First Amendment right to speak in support of their campaigns.”183 The post-Williams-Yulee lower court cases that sustained
restrictions on judicial political activities consistently confirmed the
broad First Amendment protections that judicial candidates enjoy
when campaigning for themselves.184 It seems highly unlikely that the
compelling interest in judicial integrity would support limits on spending by judicial candidates. After all, a candidate’s own campaigning
does not undermine his or her impartiality—assuming as White does
that the articulation of legal or political views is not inconsistent with
judicial impartiality—or independence.
It is even harder to see how the judicial integrity interest can support limits on spending by independent organizations that will never
decide cases or sit on the bench. The due process concern for judicial
integrity that Williams-Yulee relied on is unlikely to provide support
for limitations on the core First Amendment-protected speech of nonjudges.185 To be sure, spending by independent organizations can generate a “debt of gratitude” in judicial candidates and result in the danger of bias in favor of the spender in post-election litigation.
However, as Caperton held, the remedy for this is recusal, not limitations on spending.
3. Recusal
Caperton clearly mandates recusal due to significant independent
spending in some cases and confirms that the states are free to go
further “to impose more rigorous standards for judicial disqualification” than the Constitution requires.186 Caperton, of course, was not a
dark money case. It was the very fact that it was well-known that Don
Blankenship was financing the anti-McGraw spending that led to the
requirement that Justice Benjamin recuse. In theory, disclosure actually generates the need for recusal as there can be no danger of bias
182. 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1670 (2015).
183. Id. at 1673.
184. See, e.g., Wolfson v. Concannon, 811 F.3d 1176, 1185 (9th Cir. 2016); Winter v. Wolnitzek,
834 F.3d 681, 688–90 (6th Cir. 2016).
185. And, of course, there is no way that state codes of judicial conduct could regulate the
activities of non-judges, non-judicial-candidates, and non-lawyers.
186. 556 U.S. 868, 889–90 (2009) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828
(1986)). See also Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 794 (2002) (noting that a
state “may adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due process requires, and censure judges
who violate these standards”) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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for a financial supporter if the judge does not know the identity of that
supporter. However, even without public disclosure of the identities
of the funders of dark money spending, candidates are likely to know
who their backers are even if the voting public doesn’t. Thus, there is
a case for recusal even without disclosure – although without disclosure it will be difficult for the litigant seeking recusal to prove that the
asserted financial supporter really was one So, an effective recusal requirement is contingent on effective dark money disclosure.187
Recusal presents many difficulties, not the least of which is that in
most states the judge whose recusal is sought decides the recusal motion.188 There is also the problem alluded to by Chief Justice Roberts
in Williams-Yulee that in some settings it may be difficult to find a
judge to take the recusant’s place.189 The most significant obstacle to
recusal as a response to the specific problem of dark money spending
is that many independent committees are not de facto surrogates for a
specific individual or organization that has a stake in a specific case, as
And for the Sake of the Kids appears to have been for Don Blankenship and Massey Coal in Caperton. Instead, committees are generally
advocates for relatively broad economic, social, ideological, or partisan agendas.190
To be sure, spending to promote judges who will take a pro-business
or anti-environmental regulation approach could financially benefit
some of those who have donated to the spending committee, but that
connection is far more attenuated than the one in Caperton. Would a
judge who benefited from spending by a pro-business group have to
recuse in a case challenging a government regulation where the litigant had not contributed to the committee that had backed the judge?
Would it matter if some of those who had contributed to the committee would benefit from the decision even though they are not parties
to the case? And in some instances of independent spending—by civil
rights organizations, traditional moral values groups, or criminal defense lawyers—the funders may have no financial stake in the litigation challenging or enforcing a state regulation at all.
187. But cf., Stephen J. Ware, Judicial Elections, Judicial Impartiality and Legitimate Judicial
Lawmaking: Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar, 68 VAND. L. REV. En Banc 59, 79 (2015) (suggesting but not embracing making judicial campaign contributions anonymous to reduce the
threat to judicial impartiality).
188. See, e.g., Dmitry Bam, Recusal Failure, 18 NYU J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 631, 652–56
(2015).
189. Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1671 (2015).
190. See, e.g., Scott Greytak et al., Bankrolling the Bench: The New Politics of Judicial Elections, 2013-14, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (Oct. 2015) at 3–4, 9, 13–15, 30–34, 42–47, 59,
76–80, http://newpoliticsreport.org/app/uploads/JAS-NPJE-2013-14.pdf (exploring the large and
growing role of national partisan, economic, and ideological interests in state judicial elections).
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As Justice Scalia indicated in White, there is no constitutional difficulty if a judge holds preexisting views on the legal issues likely to
come before her. So, too, voters may choose to take those views into
account when voting on judicial candidates just as in appointive systems the appointing executive surely takes the views of prospective
nominees into account in determining who to nominate, as do the legislators whose consent may be needed to confirm the nominee. Although judges are not supposed to be representatives in exactly the
same way that legislators and executives are, they are as Chisom indicated, representatives to some extent, and, as Gregory held, also policy-makers. Accordingly, not only do independent groups have a
constitutional right to inform the voters and influence them with policy-focused campaigns, but it is hard to see why an elected judge is
improperly biased if he or she participates in cases in which the policy
issues raised by independent committee campaign advertising and arguably taken into account by the voters are salient.191 Certainly, there
is no greater bias in that case than if an appointed judge, whose perspective on an issue was likely considered by the appointing officer,
participates in a case in which that issue is central.
A robust recusal requirement triggered by significant independent
spending would also have to decide what to do when a judge, elected
in the face of significant hostile independent spending, is called upon
to participate in a case in which those who paid for that spending are
parties. It would be ironic if a committee that failed to defeat a judicial candidate could still use its spending to knock the judge out of a
case in which it has an interest by claiming bias. Yet due process
would be as threatened by the hostile judicial bias of a reelected Justice McGraw as by Justice Benjamin’s arguable “debt of gratitude” to
Don Blankenship.
There is clearly an argument for clarifying and possibly extending
Caperton’s recusal rule to cases in which a party with a significant financial interest in the outcome was also a significant financial backer
of an independent committee that supported the judge hearing the
case. Certainly, it would be useful to clarify many issues, such as how
much support—whether in absolute amounts or as a percent of total
spending—should trigger a concern about a “debt of gratitude”; how
long after the election any bias in favor of a financial backer may be
191. Professor Ware makes a similar point in arguing that while the interest in judicial impartiality requires that a judge not apply a legal rule specifically to benefit a contributor, as opposed
to other similarly situated parties, it is appropriate for a judge who shares the views of contributors to exercise a judge’s “legitimate lawmaking discretion” to develop legal rules or apply them
broadly in a manner consistent with those views. See Ware, supra note 187, at 68–78.
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presumed to continue; and what counts as a litigant interest that
would trigger concern. The Court has indicated that states may go
beyond the minimum due process requires in mandating recusal for
campaign-finance bias, but any recusal requirement would have to address these knotty issues.
Moreover, much as Williams-Yulee indicates that due process can
inform the First Amendment, it may also be the case that the First
Amendment may constrain the scope of due process. The First
Amendment has been construed to bar state regulations that discourage election spending as well as those that prohibit it. In Arizona Free
Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,192 the Supreme
Court struck down the provision of Arizona’s public funding law that
provided candidates with additional public funds to respond to high
levels of spending by opponents or independent committees. Although nothing in the law limited opposition or independent spending, the Court determined that the provision for additional public
funds imposed a “substantial burden” on the spending of those opponents and independent groups.193 A super-sensitive recusal requirement that forces judges to recuse from the cases most important to the
independent groups that supported their campaigns could be open to
a similar charge that it unconstitutionally burdens campaign speech,
which would require a showing that spending by such a group threatens the fact or appearance of judicial integrity. That would seem most
challenging with respect to the spending of partisan, ideological, or
social interest groups seeking to elect judges who actually share their
views rather than groups that hope that judges will simply be inclined
to feel grateful to their financial backers.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s judicial campaign jurisprudence reflects the
inevitable tug of war between the idealized vision of judges as impartial decision-makers attentive only to the Law with a capital “L,”
whose legitimacy as decision-makers requires some public belief in
their impartiality, and a pragmatic recognition that judges are also
policymakers who come to their cases with predispositions concerning
legal issues that will inevitably affect their judgments. This tension
concerning the appropriate role and political nature of the judge is
compounded when judges are elected. Free elections operate under
the assumptions that the voters can make decisions based on their as192. 564 U.S. 621 (2011).
193. Id. at 748.
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sessment of how the elected official will perform in office concerning
issues that matter to the voters, that candidates can make their cases
to the voters concerning their performance in office, and that other
individuals and groups with an interest in the election can also seek to
inform the voters about the candidates and influence their votes.
These operating rules for elections surely apply in judicial elections194
but they are also to at least some extent at odds with the ideals of
judicial impartiality and independence. Some attention to the special
nature of the judicial function may lead to some modification of the
rules for free elections, but too many restrictions on campaign communications will undermine the function of the election itself.
The Supreme Court’s case law demonstrates a point-counterpoint
effort to accommodate these competing concerns. Judicial candidates
must be free to communicate their views to the voters, but certain
campaign practices, such as the personal solicitation of campaign
funds, may be curtailed if they are seen as posing too great a threat to
the appearance of judicial impartiality. But the scope of the Court’s
sense of “too great a threat” is far from resolved.
Judicial campaign spending, including the spending by independent
groups, is as constitutionally protected as spending in other elections;
so, too, as in other elections, campaign spending in judicial races may
be subject to disclosure requirements. Under some circumstances a
judge may be required to recuse from a case in which the financial
interest of a major campaign supporter is at stake. But what exactly
are the circumstances that trigger a constitutional duty to recuse?
Conversely, how far can a state go in requiring recusal in response to
independent spending before that is seen as unconstitutionally burdening the rights of independent spending? Both of these questions
are far from resolved as well.
The dark money problem is really just an instance of the broader
dilemma. On the one hand, the Court’s standard campaign finance
jurisprudence provides adequate support for bringing dark money to
light without regard to the special circumstances of the judiciary. On
the other hand, judicial elections are almost certainly not special
enough to exempt them from the constitutional ban on independent
spending. Recusal requirements may in some circumstances be an ap194. As Professor Burt Neuborne has explained, “American judges, especially appellate
judges, routinely make new law in order to resolve a case or controversy before them. . . . That is
why judicial candidates must be free to express their views on legal issues during the campaign,
allowing the electorate to gain a sense of where the potential judge’s view of the common good
may lie.” Burt Neuborne, What Do Judges Do All Day?, 68 VAND. L. REV. En Banc 99, 110
(2015).
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propriate response to dark money spending. But recusal is likely to be
least adequate in dealing with the economic, social, ideological, or
partisan spending that accounts for much of the growth of dark money
spending.
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